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Recasting Complaints: 
An Argument for Procedural Alternatives 
Paul David Menair* 
In the time that has passed since the academic debate regarding 
“substance-specific”   procedure   reform   that   took   place   during   the   1980’s  
and  1990’s,  numerous  changes  in the civil procedure landscape targeted at 
specific substantive categories of litigation have either been formally 
adopted in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or judicially adopted, 
despite the continuing trans-substantive premise of the Rules.  This Article 
suggests that increased tailoring of procedure to specific cases may be 
inevitable and that reformers could better approach such tailoring by 
creating alternative non-exclusive procedural mechanisms, rather than by 
adapting existing procedure to the  “type”  of  case  in  a  mandatory  fashion.    
This   approach,   modeled   after   the   variety   of   “special   statutory  
proceedings”  that  currently  exist  in  state  law,  would  encourage  and  allow  
reformers to avoid political conflict and the inevitable unintended 
consequences of containerizing lawsuits into litigation categories like the 
“product   liability   case.”     The  approach might also help address some of 
the other concerns of critics of substance-specific procedure, such as the 
threat of a return to technical rules of common law pleading. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a young lawyer who has filed a lawsuit against a 
trustee in a state court.  Your complaint demands, among other things, an 
“accounting”  of  the  trust  fund.1  Perhaps you are not entirely sure what that 
thing  called  an  “accounting”  would  actually  look  like  if  you  got  it,  but  you  
ask for it anyway.2 
Now imagine that, with your complaint, you diligently sent out a 
complete set of written discovery requests, including routine requests for 
copies of account statements and other financial records of the trust—
material that you believed to be eminently within the scope of allowable 
discovery   under   your   state’s   civil   procedure   code.3  In response, you 
 
* J.D., Georgia State University, 2003. 
 1 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 4.3(5) (2d ed. 
1993) (discussing the accounting remedy). 
 2 You would not be alone in being confused.  See Joel Eichengrun, Remedying the Remedy of 
Accounting, 60 IND. L.J. 463, 476 (1985) (citing cases showing   that   “some  confusion   remains”  with  
respect to the meaning of the accounting remedy in contemporary practice). 
 3 Most likely modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) (defining the scope of 
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receive an objection stating that your opponent refuses to provide the 
requested  material  because  to  do  so  would  be  the  “functional  equivalent”  of  
the relief sought in your demand for an accounting.4 
Assuming there are no controlling cases in your jurisdiction to show 
that this is clearly wrong, what does one make of this assertion?  On the 
one hand, it seems ludicrous to contend that a trustee can avoid producing 
ordinarily discoverable documents just because the complaint includes a 
demand that the court order the defendant to do something that seems 
conceptually similar.5  On the other hand, there is certain logic to the 
argument  that  if  a  demand  for  an  “accounting”  is  understood  as  a  demand  
that the court order the defendant to produce certain information, it seems 
unfair to allow the plaintiff to get the same information without having to 
first prove entitlement to the remedy.6 
This confusion arises from competing understandings of the 
accounting remedy.  Some would argue that at least one such 
understanding—accounting as a procedural mechanism for obtaining 
information about the trust fund—has been rendered meaningless by 
contemporary discovery practices, even if it continues to haunt the legal 
imagination.7  The confusion has led to a call for reform of the substantive 
law  by  “remedying  the  remedy”  of  accounting  to make it clear that what is 
meant is simply accounting for profits as an element of damages.8  
However, contemporary discovery practice may be an imperfect substitute 
for the remedial discovery conducted under pre-reform equity procedure—
managed discovery conducted before a special master after a preliminary 
showing of entitlement to the judicial resources of the court.9  Accordingly, 
this recollection of the old meaning of accounting may suggest the 
possibility   of   innovation   in   the   form   of   “selective   substance-specific 
procedure.”10 
 
discovery  as  including  “any  nonprivileged  matter  that  is  relevant  to  any  party’s  claim  or  defense”). 
 4 The author has encountered this objection on several occasions in practice. 
 5 See Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 476 (arguing that contemporary discovery practice makes the 
aspect  of  the  remedy  that  he  calls  “accounting  for  discovery”  obsolete). 
 6 Eichengrun  argues  that  this  “logic”  is  simply  confusion  arising  from  a  misunderstanding of the 
remedy.  See id.  The present author will present a somewhat different argument.  See infra Part IV. 
 7 See Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 476; see also DOBBS, supra note 1, § 4.3(5) (adopting 
Eichengrun’s  description  of  the  remedy  in  contemporary  practice). 
 8 See Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 476. 
 9 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA §§ 436–45 (13th ed. 1988) (describing the remedy in equity under the old 
system). 
 10 See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for 
Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 28–29   (1994)   (proposing   “selective  
substance-specific   procedure”   as   alternative   terminology   for   what   commentators had previously 
described as  “non-trans-substantive  procedure.”);;  see also Robert Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some 
Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1974) (initiating the discussion of substance 
specific reform); Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. 
Rev.  1155,  1159  (2006)  (arguing  that  Cover’s  “deeper  point”  was  that  “sometimes  the  justification  for  a  
procedural  choice  necessarily  had  to   take  account  of  substantive  policies,”  and  there  may  be  value  in  
making this connection explicit); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil 
MENAIR 3/23/2009 7:03 PM 
2008] Recasting Complaints 335 
Any proposal to adapt different procedures to different types of civil 
action inevitably harkens back to the dark, ancient days of common law 
pleading rules—a frightening prospect for some.11  Contemporary civil 
procedure professors  mention  the  “forms  of  action,”  if   they  mention them 
at all, as being only of limited and primarily theoretical interest to the 
contemporary student.12  The fundamental premise of civil procedure as it 
is taught in law school today is derived from Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil  Procedure:  “There  is  one  form  of  action.”13  This  “trans-substantive”  
premise of civil practice assumes that the entire scope of civil litigation is 
best governed by a single set of procedural rules.14  Since  the  late  1980’s,  
certain academics have advocated a partial return to substance-specific 
procedure.15  However, other scholars have roundly criticized any proposal 
to depart from the trans-substantive premise.  These critics insist that 
substance specificity would open the door to the evils supposedly 
associated with the old system—notably a waste of judicial resources in 
settling procedural disputes and resolving cases on technicalities rather than 
on the merits.16 
 
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1929–41 (1989) (defending substance 
specificity and criticizing proponents of trans-substantivity for relying on judicial discretion to tailor 
general rules to individual cases in the name of procedural neutrality); Carl Tobias, The Transformation 
of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501,  1508  (1992)  (arguing  that  “the  trans-substantive 
center  will  not  hold”);;  Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting  Devolution  or  Bleak  to  the  Future:  Subrin’s  New-
Old Procedure   as  a  Possible  Antidote   to  Dreyfuss’s   “Tolstoy  Problem,”   46  FLA. L. REV. 57 (1994) 
(discussing  Subrin’s  specific  proposals). 
 11 See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An 
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 
2068 (1989) (describing substance-specific  procedure  as  “a  ghost  in  the  darkness  surrounding  academic  
discussions of the future  of  civil  procedure.”). 
 12 See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 371–93 (4th ed. 3d prtg. 1996).  Yeazell 
duly  notes  Subrin’s  argument  for  a  selective  return  to  substance  specific  procedure but maintains that 
the primary reason why students should understand common law pleading is its relevance to 
understanding its lingering impact on substantive law.  See id. at 372–73 (citing Stephen Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
909 (1987) [hereinafter How Equity Conquered]). 
 13 FED. R. CIV. P. 2; see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 12 (discussing the 
evolution of contemporary civil practice). 
 14 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 11,   at   2068   (“[J]udicially-made rules directing courts to 
proceed differently according to the substantive nature of the rights enforced is an idea that has been 
wisely rejected in the past and must be rejected for the present  and  for  the  future.”). 
 15 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 16 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 11.  For a brief summary of arguments in favor of trans-
substantive procedural rules, see William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1885 (2002): 
First, trans-substantive rules are efficient.  If the same set of procedural rules governs every 
form of action, lawyers and judges need only master this one form.  Moreover, trans-
substantive rules are efficient in that adjudicatory resources do not have to be expended 
determining which rules of procedure to apply to a given action.  Second, trans-substantive 
rules make procedure more transparent and adjudication on the merits more likely, because 
the time not spent on selecting the appropriate procedural rules can instead be spent 
assessing the merits of the action.  Finally, trans-substantive rules appear fair because all 
cases  are  treated  ‘equally.’ 
(footnote omitted). 
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It   is  worth  noting  that  “substance-specific  procedure”  does  exist, and 
always has existed, at the state level.  Take, for example, procedures for 
eviction of a non-paying tenant.17  For obvious practical reasons, an 
eviction  proceeding  cannot   conform   to   the  contours  of   a   “civil  action”   in  
which the parties exchange pleadings, bicker about discovery for six 
months or more, and then attempt to try the case by motion.18  Accordingly, 
the state legislatures have enacted or retained special statutory proceedings 
adapted to the needs of landlords for prompt eviction of non-paying tenants 
despite protestations in state civil procedure codes about there being only 
one allowable form of civil action.19 
In light of this stubborn persistence of substance-specific civil 
procedure at the state level, despite the efficiency supposedly derived from 
the exorcism of substance from procedure in contemporary civil practice, 
one suspects that something other than fidelity to an abstract principle was 
driving the negative reaction to the discussion of substance-specific 
procedure during the 1980’s  and  1990’s.     It   is  apparent  that  the  defenders  
of civil trans-substantivity did not fear the proposals for substance-specific 
reform in the abstract so much as the potential havoc that interested parties 
could wreak in the rule-making process if such reform were to occur in 
politically-charged contexts such as civil rights litigation.20  Paul 
Carrington, the harshest critic, describes what he believes was really going 
on as follows: 
[N]umerous academics were proposing to make the Rules non-trans-substantive 
in the misguided belief that this would advance the ability of civil rights 
 
 17 See Randy G. Gerchick, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer 
and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1994) (discussing 
summary eviction).  For an attempt to argue around the existence of such substance-specific procedure, 
see Carrington, supra note 11, at 2079–80  (“There  are,   to  be  sure,  rules  specifically  applicable   to   the  
representation of corporate shareholders, suits in admiralty, or proceedings in eminent domain.  These 
rules do not apply to litigation between individuals disputing liability for an auto accident.  Such special 
rules  are  exceptional  in  their  limited  application.”)  (footnotes  omitted). 
 18 See Gerchick, supra note 17, at 764: 
Intending to provide landlords a more cost-effective means of removing problem tenants 
than would otherwise be available, most states have established summary eviction 
proceedings, which move the landlord's eviction lawsuit through the court system much 
faster than in most civil proceedings by (1) allowing litigation only of issues that are 
immediately relevant to determining which party retains the right to possession of the rental 
unit, (2) drastically reducing the time a tenant has to answer the complaint or conduct 
discovery, and (3) requiring the trial to take place within twenty days of the landlord's 
request for a trial date. 
(footnote omitted). 
 19 Id. 
 20 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 11, at 2074–75: 
Moreover, if the procedure rules were the result of a test of strength among political 
organizations, it is obvious, at least in our political system, that rules would generally favor 
those  litigants  with  the  greater  resources,  especially  those  identifiable  ‘repeat  players’  who  
have the larger stakes in procedure rules and hence the greater political energy. 
(footnote omitted). 
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plaintiffs to enforce their claims; I was obliged to resist that idea on the ground 
that it would have put the rulemaking process into the political cockpit.21 
Whatever one makes of the arguments for and against trans-
substantivity, the attempt by scholars like Carrington to draw a line in the 
sand against substance-specific reform has begun to fail at the federal level.  
There have been recent changes in the judicial application of purportedly 
trans-substantive procedural rules with a substance-specific component, 
primarily the erection of barriers against certain types of litigation in the 
form of heightened pleading standards—exactly the sort of unfortunate 
“political”  outcome that scholars feared would arise if we opened the door 
to expressly substance-specific reform in the rule-making process.22 
The example of the special statutory proceeding for eviction suggests 
that   tailoring   procedure   to   cases,   even   if   “political,”   may be the only 
acceptable compromise in some instances.23  While some might 
conceivably argue that a proceeding against a non-paying tenant should be 
procedurally   “equal”   to   any   other   lawsuit,   states   have   developed   or  
maintained through the political process alternative procedural 
mechanisms.24  The further evolution of substance-specific civil procedure 
is not necessarily evil and is likely inevitable.  A model for approaching it 
can be found in state ancillary, non-exclusive   “special   statutory  
 
 21 Paul Carrington, Civil Procedure and Politics, http://www.paulcarrington.com/Civil%20 
Procedure%20Politics.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2008).  An example of the type of substance-specific 
argument that Professor Carrington was objecting to can be found in Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race 
Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 
105–12 (1994), in which the author argues that Rule 12 dismissals of civil rights claims are often the 
result of racial subordination and that no civil rights case should be subject to dismissal until after the 
parties  have  engaged  in  discovery.    For  a  critique  of  Carrington’s  position,  see  Burbank,  supra note 10, 
at 1935–36: 
Professor Carrington is alert to the costs of departing from the appearance   of   “political  
neutrality”   but   deaf   to   the   costs   of  what   Judge  Weinstein   calls   “procedural   subterfuge.”    
Indeed, at times he appears to swallow his own propaganda, as when he portrays as a 
central   feature   of   our   legal   system,   upon   which   Congress   “relies,”   the   class   action  
amendments in 1966, yet fails to acknowledge that the impact of those amendments on 
power relations was anticipated, if not intended, by his predecessor, Judge Kaplan.  
(footnote omitted). 
 22 See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1059–64 
(2003) (discussing judicially created heightened pleading standards); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998) (same); Jeffrey A. Parness, Amy M. 
Leonetti & Austin W. Bartlett, The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws, 78 NEB. L. 
REV. 412 (1999) (reviewing new substance-specific pleading standards relating to securities litigation, 
professional malpractice litigation, punitive damages claims, childhood sexual abuse claims and civil 
rights claims, and arguing that these amount to revision of the underlying substantive law, raising 
choice of law and separation of powers issues).  For the law and economics argument in favor of such 
heightened pleading standards, see Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The 
Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper 
Series, Law and Economics Working Paper No. 06-06, 2006).  See also Burbank, supra note 10, at 
1929–41  (arguing  in  the  1980’s  that  procedural uniformity has always been a sham). 
 23 See Tobias, supra note 10,  at  1508  and  throughout  (“The  preferable  approach  is  to   transcend  
trans-substantivity, to acknowledge candidly its limitations, and to recognize and meet forthrightly the 
compelling challenge of formulating procedures that will efficaciously treat civil litigation in the 
twenty-first  century.”). 
 24 Although the devil is, of course, in the details.  See Gerchick, supra note 17, at 777–81. 
MENAIR 3/23/2009 7:03 PM 
338 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:333 
proceedings.”    Rather than directly attempt substance-specific reform in the 
context of the fraught and contentious federal procedure reform process, 
where most of the players are heavily invested in complex cases and have 
little interest in or knowledge of the more routine cases, the expansion of 
ancillary procedures at the state level might provide a laboratory for 
experimentation with smaller cases that could ultimately be adopted at the 
federal level.25 
Instead of the heightened pleading standards and other mechanisms 
proposed by those who would depart from the spirit and letter of the federal 
rules only when they deem it necessary to keep people out of the 
courthouse, the rules should provide for streamlined, tailored procedures in 
appropriate cases as an alternative to procedural rules tailored to meet the 
conflicting demands of litigants in the most complex, expensive, and 
discovery-intensive cases.  By focusing on providing procedural 
alternatives, as   opposed   to   defining   all   lawsuits   by   “type,”   substance-
specific procedure reform might avoid the potential for boundary disputes 
among  revived  “forms  of  action”  because  the  focus  would be on what the 
pleading parties want, as opposed to what theory of action will most closely 
conform to the facts as developed in discovery.26  Finally, a focus on 
providing procedural alternatives, as opposed to tailoring default rules to 
different types of cases, could help de-politicize the debate regarding 
substance-specific reform. 
To clarify what critics of substance specificity fear, Part I of this 
article   begins   by   discussing   “substance-specific procedure”   as   it   used   to  
exist, using the example of the forms of action with respect to title to land.  
Part II examines a specific set of special statutory proceedings established 
in Georgia with respect to title actions, showing that the existence of these 
procedures has neither led to technical pleading requirements nor the other 
evils critics associate with non-trans-substantive procedure.  Part III looks 
at the example of the action for accounting and discusses whether there 
exists a specific set of cases that might benefit from the revival of an 
ancient remedy—the judicially managed accounting—in the form of an 
ancillary substance-specific proceeding.  Part IV discusses how revival of 
the original conception of accounting as a discovery-oriented remedy might 
relate to standing proposals for the reform of discovery practice in general. 
 
 25 See Mark C. Weber, The Federal Civil Rules Amendments of 1993 and Complex Litigation: A 
Comment on Trans-substantivity and Special Rules for Large and Small Federal Cases, 14 REV. LITIG. 
113 (1994) (arguing that the Federal Rules are well-adapted to complex litigation for a variety of 
historical  reasons  and  that  substance  specific  reform  should  focus  on  streamlining  “small”  cases). 
 26 Compare with Carrington, supra note   11,   at   2081   (“The   teaching   of   [the   Anglo-American 
tradition’s]  adverse  experience  is  that  complexity resulting from categorization of procedures in courts 
of general or broad subject matter jurisdiction produces wasteful disputes as to which set of procedural 
rules controls.”). 
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I.  TITLE ACTIONS AND THE PREHISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY PROCEDURE 
To assist in developing an understanding of the debate regarding 
trans-substantivity,   one   should   recall  what   “substance-specific”  procedure 
looked like in the era prior to the evolution of trans-substantive procedure 
in the nineteenth century.  One window into the world of writ pleading is 
the history of title actions in the common law—a history that was once a 
core aspect of the first-year legal curriculum but is increasingly forgotten as 
fewer civil procedure instructors feel the need to explain to their students 
that there once was more than one form of action.27 
Note that the history retold here is not necessarily the history of title 
actions as it might be told by a contemporary historian based on 
contemporary research.  Rather, it is the history of the forms of action 
respecting title to land as that story was known and told during the decades 
around the turn of the last century—during the era of procedural reform.28 
The story, as told by Frederick Maitland in a series of lectures first 
published in 1909, begins with the writ of right, which read something like 
this: 
Breve de recto 
Rex K (a bishop, baron or other lord of manor) salutem.  Praecipimus tibi quod 
sine dilatione plenum rectum teneas A de uno mesuagio cum pertinentiis in 
Trumpingtone quod clamat tenere de te per liberum servitium [unius denarii per 
annum] pro omni servitio, et quod X ei deforciat.  Et nisi feceris, vicecomes de 
Cantabrigia faciat, ne amplius inde clamorem audiamus pro defectu recti. 
The King to K greeting.  We command you that without delay you do full right 
to A of one messuage with the appurtenances in Trumpington which he claims to 
hold of you by free service of [so much] per annum for all service, of which X 
 
 27 See YEAZELL, supra note 12,   at   372   (“Until   a   few   decades   ago   the material in this section 
[discussing the forms of action] would have taken up almost all of a beginning civil procedure 
course.”);;  see also Mary Brigid McManoman, The History of the Civil Procedure Course: A Study In 
Evolving Pedagogy, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 397 (1998) (discussing the evolution of the contemporary civil 
procedure course). 
 28 For a discussion of the history of procedural reform in the early twentieth century, see Subrin, 
How Equity Conquered, supra note 12, at 943–75.  Our version of the story of the forms of action at 
common law mainly derives from F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.H. 
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1965) (1909).  This focus reduces the relevance 
of the fact that traditional narrative relies on the explanatory framework represented by the term 
“feudalism;;”  a  term  largely  abandoned  by  medievalists.     See Elizabeth A.R. Brown, The Tyranny of a 
Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe, 79 AM. HIST. REV. 1063 (1974) (arguing 
against “feudalism”   as   a   conceptual   framework   for   understanding   medieval   society);;   SUSAN 
REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND VASSALS: THE MEDIEVAL EVIDENCE REINTERPRETED (1994) (same).  However, 
it is worth noting that, despite a near consensus among historians against the utility of the traditional 
feudal pyramid as a lens through which to understand medieval texts, the idea persists in legal literature.  
See, e.g., Mark A. Senn, English Life and Law in the Time of the Black Death, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 507,  516  (2003)  (“As a system of land ownership, [feudalism] is a pyramid with the king at the 
top beholden to no one, layers of lords in the middle beholden to their superiors, and serfs at the bottom 
beholden  to  everyone.”). 
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deforceth him.  And unless you will do this, let the sheriff of Cambridge do it 
that we may hear no more clamour thereupon for want of right.29 
There are a few things to note in this.  First, the writ is addressed to 
the lord of the territory in which a property dispute has arisen, commanding 
that person to give justice to someone who claims to have a right to land 
“by  free  service”  in  that  territory  (i.e.,  a  tenancy  in  land  of  some  sort  within  
the  lord’s  larger  territory).30  Setting aside the vexed question of the manner 
in  which  a  tenancy  “by  free  service”  might  differ  from  what  we  would  in  
present terms understand to be a fee simple estate,31 the purpose of the writ 
is to initiate a process designed to identify who has the right to this 
property,  whatever  that  “right”  may  consist  of.32  The second thing to note 
is that the King is assuming the authority to tell the territorial lord what to 
do about the claim, but the action is not initially  in  the  King’s  court.    It  is  to  
be  initiated,  rather,  in  the  local  courts  controlled  by  “K,”  and  the  writ  itself  
is  simply  a  threat  to  intervene  if  the  local  lord’s  court  does  not  resolve the 
matter.33 
As Maitland tells the story, there also were writs of right directing the 
sheriff to take immediate action—originally used only in cases involving 
claims  by  or  affecting  the  King’s  own  direct  tenants,  which  later  came  to  be  
used as a vehicle for direct intervention in territorial disputes outside of the 
king’s   personal   territory—leading to tension between the King and his 
barons: 
In saying that this simple writ . . . was only used when the demandant claimed to 
hold of the king as tenant in chief, we have been guilty of some inaccuracy.  
Glanville tells us that such a writ is issued when the king pleases; Henry II was 
not very careful of the interests of mesne lords and would send a [writ] to the 
sheriff when a Writ of Right addressed to the lord would have been more in 
harmony with feudal principles.  But this was regarded as a tyrannical abuse and 
was struck at by a clause of the Great Charter.34 
So, there is conflict here respecting jurisdiction, which shall be discussed 
further in a moment. 
There were, Maitland explains, various problems associated with the 
writ from the outset.  The first and perhaps most important was that the 
mode of trial was trial by combat.35  The second problem was delay.36  In 
addition to various customary mechanisms allowing the parties to delay 
 
 29 MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 82–83 (internal citations omitted). 
 30 Id. at 23. 
 31 See Joshua C. Tate, Ownership and Possession in the Early Common Law, 48 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 280, 282–84   (criticizing   Maitland’s   assumption   of   a   rough   equivalence   between   medieval  
concepts   of   “right”   and   “seisin”   and   contemporary   notions   of   “ownership”   and   “possession”).      See 
generally S.F.C. MILSOM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (2003). 
 32 MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 21–27. 
 33 Id. at 22–23. 
 34 Id. at 23. 
 35 Id. at 26. 
 36 Id. at 24. 
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trial—the most extreme being, apparently, a right to take to bed for a year 
and avoid the whole thing—the entire process depended at a certain basic 
level on individuals finding the time to represent themselves in a world 
without trial lawyers.37  Accordingly, there was any number of excuses for 
non-appearance that would not be tolerated in today’s  regime  of  advocacy  
by representatives.38 
As Maitland notes, new procedures arose to mitigate these problems 
that, not coincidentally, served the royal interest in consolidating legal 
authority in the King.39  Indeed,   this   is  Maitland’s   primary   theme.      The  
forms of action grew increasingly elaborate through discrete attempts to 
resolve difficulties with earlier writs, a process largely driven by the 
tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces acting on the distribution 
of authority in medieval society, leaving the substantive law to grow and 
develop  “in  the  interstices  of  procedure.”40 
The  initial  development  was  the  emergence  of  the  “assizes”  of  Novel  
Disseisin,   Mort   d’Ancestor,   Darrein   Presentment,   and   Utrum.41  These 
were procedures responding to specific land issues in which resort could be 
had to a royal court in the first instance, with trial by a deliberative body 
known  as  an  “assize.”42  For our purposes, the latter two possessory assizes 
are worth ignoring because an understanding of them would require an 
unnecessary detour into the history of ecclesiastic land tenure and what was 
known  as  “advowson,”  the  right  of  certain  landholders to appoint persons 
to hold church office.43  But  Novel  Dissein  and  Mort  d’Ancestor  are  worth  
briefly considering. 
Novel Disseisin was an assize available to a person claiming to have 
been  unjustly  dispossessed  of  “seisin,”  a  concept  reduced  by  Maitland  and 
reducible for our purposes to meaning simply possession of the land 
pursuant to a claim of freehold title (as opposed to and distinct from an 
absolute   right   to   the   land  equivalent   to   “ownership”   in   the   contemporary  
sense).44  In modern terms, this action would be somewhat analogous to an 
action for wrongful eviction, except that it was not an action between 
landlord and tenant as we would understand those terms, and no rights 
other than the right to immediate possession were determined in the action, 
with the  only  question  being  whether  the  “disseisor”  unjustly  deprived  the  
plaintiff of possession.45  Having lost, the disseisor could still dispossess 
 
 37 Id. at 25. 
 38 Id. at 24–25. 
 39 Id. at 25–26. 
 40 Id. at 1. 
 41 Id. at 27–33. 
 42 Id. at 34–35. 
 43 But see Tate, supra note 31, at 283–84 (arguing that the advowson writs have not received 
sufficient attention by scholars). 
 44 MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 27–29.  But see Tate, supra note 31, at 295–99 (arguing against 
this alleged equivalence). 
 45 MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 27–28. 
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the plaintiff in an action on a writ of right.46  The understanding that the 
case was solely about possession, as opposed to what we would think of as 
ownership, allowed the King to assert jurisdiction over the case despite the 
local   lords’   claim   that   the   rights   of   their   “tenants”   should   be   decided   in  
their local courts.47 
The  Assize  Mort   d’Ancestor  was   similarly   conceived as a matter of 
possession rather than right.48  In this form of action, an heir would attempt 
to show that his near  ancestor  died  “seised”  of  the  land  and  that  someone  
had taken seisin in the property before the plaintiff was able to do so 
himself.49  Once again, the action did not determine rights to the land in the 
same manner as the writs of right did, with the only question being who 
was entitled to immediate possession of the land.50 
These new forms of action remained procedurally onerous, so litigants 
continued to seek alternatives.51  In the next phase of procedural 
development, instead of expanding on the assizes, the procedures in land 
cases in the crown courts expanded by the development of a profusion of 
“Writs   of   Entry.”52  Like the assizes, these writs excused the royal 
assumption of jurisdiction over proprietary rights to land outside of the 
King’s  own  property  by  limiting  the  action  to  a  consideration  of  who  had  
the right to seisin, without any determination as to who had the ultimate 
proprietary right to the land.53  Unlike the assizes, however, the theory 
underlying the writs of entry was that one of a variety of possible specific 
and recent incidents (depending on the form of writ) justified a claim that 
the seisin of the one in possession was improper and an immediate demand 
that the possessor abandon the property.54  By a proliferation of these forms 
of   action,   the   royal   courts   blurred   the   “feudal”   distinction   between  
proprietary actions, which needed to be brought in the courts where the 
tenancy was located, and purely possessory actions, which could be 
brought in a more efficient manner in the royal courts.55 
In the next phase of evolution, the pendulum shifted against the royal 
prerogative to expand the number of writs, with one exception opening up a 
whole new line of expansion into the realm of what we would today call 
tort law: 
The whole system stiffens.  Men have learnt that a power to invent new remedies 
is a power to create new rights and duties, and it is no longer to be suffered that 
 
 46 Id. at 28. 
 47 Id. at 27. 
 48 Id. at 29–30. 
 49 Id. at 29. 
 50 Id. at 27–30. 
 51 Id. at 41–45. 
 52 Id. at 41–42. 
 53 Id. at 44. 
 54 Id. at 42. 
 55 Id. at 44.  For a more recent discussion of these writs, see Joseph Biancalana, The Origin and 
Early History of the Writs of Entry, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 513 (2007). 
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the chancellor or the judges should wield this power. . . .  But when we say that 
but little use was made of this Statute there is one great exception.  It is regarded 
as the statutory warrant for the variation of the writs of trespass so as to suit 
special cases, until at length—about the end of the Middle Ages—lawyers 
perceive  that  they  have  a  new  form  ‘Trespass  upon  the  special  case’  or  ‘Case.’56 
Out of the law of trespass arose the action of ejectment, designed to 
protect from dispossession tenants in the contemporary sense (i.e., persons 
with a right to occupy the land for a term, as opposed to free tenants in 
fee).57  Because the writs of right and entry and the assizes were subject to 
procedural delay and hyper-technical rules of pleading, plaintiffs developed 
a legal fiction to recover possession of land.  They would lease the property 
to a straw man and, upon his ouster from the property, bring an action in 
the name of John Doe for trespass in ejectment.58  This fiction became 
refined and elaborate and expanded to take up most real property litigation 
by the Tudor period: 
The development of this action is a long story and about such a matter it is hard 
to fix any dates—one cannot tell the exact moment at which a proceeding 
becomes fictitious—but I believe we may say that during the Tudor reigns the 
action of ejectment became the regular mode of recovering the possession of 
land.59 
The   “real   actions”   remained   for   their   utility   in   special   cases   and  
eventually, albeit not until the nineteenth century in England, the action for 
ejectment was reformed to eliminate the element of legal fiction.60  
Moreover, in the intervening years, various forms of equity were also 
utilized to meet the demands of the unprovided-for case where a petitioner 
had possession but knew of a competing claim that cast doubt on his right 
to the land.61 
In reasonably short form, such is the history of the development of the 
forms of action relating to title to land as it stood around the time of the 
procedural reforms that attempted to do away with all of this nonsense.  
And it makes a case for trans-substantive civil procedure, as each attempt 
to provide a substance-specific avenue for the pursuit of title actions falls in 
favor of a newer, faster, more flexible alternative.  However, it is worth 
noting   a   number   of   things.      To   begin  with,   the   “boundary   disputes”   that  
were arguably the fatal flaw in this system arose from specific conflicts 
over jurisdiction that required the pretext of distinct forms of action, not 
from any lack of understanding of the nature of the action or the remedy 
sought.  The story is complicated, but its complexity was context dependent 
and was not the product of substance specificity itself.  As Part II will 
demonstrate, this proliferation of writs was easily reformed during the 
 
 56 MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 51–52. 
 57 Id. at 57. 
 58 Id. at 58–59; see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *150–51. 
 59 MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 59. 
 60 Id. at 60–61. 
 61 See, e.g., infra notes 62–83 and accompanying text. 
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nineteenth century into two readily and rationally distinguishable forms of 
action—one at law for dispossessed claimants and the other in equity for 
parties in possession who wanted to remove a cloud on their title.62  It is 
unclear whether the nineteenth century requirement to plead one or the 
other of these two fundamental forms of title action at the outset of a case 
caused a vast amount of unfair prejudice in the form of dismissals, as the 
critics of substance-specific procedure suggest.63 
Finally, as any practitioner dealing with these matters can tell, the 
forms of action discussed by Maitland never entirely disappeared from the 
substantive law—they persist in the form of claims and remedies.64  
Procedure reform was just that—a reform of procedure—with the 
substantive law that was once so closely attached to procedure left 
unmoored as free-floating  “causes  of  action.”65  A plaintiff in contemporary 
practice need only state a claim in simple terms, but ultimately must prove 
a set of defined elements and mold his or her case to those elements in a 
process no less restrictive than the old forms of action from which these 
“causes   of   action”   derive.66  The liberality of contemporary procedure 
derives not from elimination of category distinctions from the law but from 
the possibility of amendment and the elimination of demurrer practice. 
II.  CONTEMPORARY TITLE ACTIONS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF REFORM 
As  Maitland  himself   said:  “The   forms  of  action  we  have  buried,  but  
they   still   rule   us   from   their   graves.”67  The persistence of the forms of 
action in the substantive side of civil practice can be seen by taking a look 
at a recent ejectment case in Georgia.68  Georgia is an interesting state to 
look at in studying the more recent evolution of the common law forms of 
 
 62 See discussion infra Part III. 
 63 As authority for their contention that common law pleading consisted   in   large  part  of  “petty  
haggling over  pointless  distinctions,”  resulting  in  unfairness  and  a  waste  of  judicial  resources, the critics 
of substance-specific procedure tend to either cite to one another or simply assert the premise as self-
evident.  See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1974 & n.12 (1989) (citing no authority); Carrington, supra note 11, at 2080 n.77 
(citing to himself); Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 1885 n.77 (citing Carrington and Shapiro). 
 64 See Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note  12,  at  915  (“[The]  organized  body  of  what  is  
now  commonly  called  substantive  law  evolved  from  the  writs.”). 
 65 See id. at 975–82  (discussing  the  attempt  to  purge  the  concept  of  a  “cause  of  action”  from  the  
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 66 See Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1155, 1177 (1993): 
No matter how we describe it, most civil litigation examines events and determines if they 
add up to believed facts which fit within the elements of a cause of action.  I have written 
about how Clark and his cohorts eschewed the terms facts and cause of action.  But that is 
the reality within which litigators have to work. . . . Many of the individual pieces of the 
litigation process—pleading, 12(b)(6), discovery, burdens of production and persuasion, 
relevancy issues, summary judgment, directed verdict, jury instructions, opening and 
closing arguments, one's sense of various methods of ADR—require a mastery of the 
concept of causes of action and their elements. 
 67 MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 2. 
 68 MVP Investment Co. v. North Fulton Express Oil, 639 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
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action   in   their   reincarnation   as   substantive   “causes”   of   action,   divorced  
from the rigid procedural formulas of writ pleading practice, because 
Georgia was one of the first states to attempt codification of the substance 
of the common law, including the maxims of equity enacted as actual 
statutes.69  With respect to land title actions, the original Georgia Code of 
1863 contained a statutory provision for equitable action to quiet title in the 
form  of  what  eventually  came  to  be  known  as  “conventional  quia timet.”70  
This was modeled after the traditional bill in equity seeking an injunction 
to prevent an anticipated future harmful   act,   “quia   timet”  being  Latin   for  
“because   he   fears.”71  The ordinary proceeding at common law for 
ejectment was similarly codified, albeit later, in the 1895 code.72  
Accordingly, on the one hand, ejectment was available in cases of 
dispossession.    On  the  other  hand,  in  cases  involving  a  “cloud  on  title,”  in  
which the plaintiff was in possession but feared a challenge to title or 
possession due to the existence of, for example, a void deed, the action in 
equity was the appropriate avenue for seeking relief because ejectment did 
not provide an adequate remedy at law.73 
In 1917, the Georgia General Assembly attempted to provide an 
alternative mechanism for establishing title to land in the Georgia Land 
Registration Act of 1917.74  This Act allows a petitioner to obtain 
certification from the superior court of their title to the land by means of an 
in rem action, with notice to interested parties and adjoining landowners.75  
The action is noticed both by publication in newspapers and by physical 
posting on the property.76  In practice, this procedure is seldom utilized, 
either because lawyers are more familiar with the older causes of action, 
which remain in place, or because they are suspicious of a procedure that 
 
 69 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 23-1-6   (1982)   (“Nature   of   equity—Follows   the   law”).      For   the 
history  of  Georgia’s  codification  efforts,  beginning  in  1860–63, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Codification 
and Consequences: The Georgian Motif, 14 GA. L. REV. 737 (1980).  Regarding codification, see 
generally Nathan M. Crystal, Codification and the Rise of the Restatement Movement, 54 WASH. L. 
REV. 239 (1979) and Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: The Anticlassical Jurisprudence of 
Anticodification, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149 (2007). 
 70 GA. CODE § 3153 (1863) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-40 to -44 (1982) 
(conventional quia timet)). 
 71 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (8th ed. 2004); see also STORY, supra note 9, at ch. XXI 
(discussing the quia timet bill in traditional equity practice). 
 72 GA. CIV. CODE § 5004 (1895) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-11-1 to -15 (2002) 
(ejectment)). 
 73 See Newcomer v. Newcomer, 606 S.E.2d 238, 239 (Ga. 2004): 
The reason of this rule is that, where the defendant is in possession, the plaintiff has a 
remedy to test his title at law by bringing an action in ejectment, which is ordinarily 
deemed an adequate remedy, and in consequence there is no ground for the exercise of 
equitable jurisdiction, which is based upon the fact that, where the plaintiff is in possession, 
he can maintain no action at law to test his title. 
(quoting Mentone Hotel & Realty Co. v. Taylor, 130 S.E. 527, 529 (Ga. 1925)). 
 74 Currently codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-2-60 to -84 (2008).  See GEORGE PINDAR, 
GEORGIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PROCEDURE WITH FORMS § 25-10 (Daniel F. Hinkel ed., 6th ed. 
2004) (discussing the procedure). 
 75 PINDAR, supra note 73, § 25-10. 
 76 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-67 (2008). 
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requires  broad  notification  of  a  weakness  in   their  client’s  claim  of   title   to  
outside parties and another set of records to keep track of in addition to 
deeds, certificates of registration that are physically issued to the owner as 
proof of title.77 
In 1966, the Georgia General Assembly tried again to reform title 
litigation by passing the Quiet Title Act of 1966, this time creating a 
statutory   proceeding   called   “quia   timet   against   all   the   world.”78  This 
statutory proceeding allows any person claiming an estate in land, defined 
as  “an  estate  of  freehold  present  or  future  or  any  estate  for  years  of  which  at  
least   five  years   are  unexpired,”   to  bring  an   action   to  obtain  a   court  order  
recognizing their rights in the property, regardless of whether they are in 
possession and regardless of whether they are able to identify a specific 
“cloud”  on   their  asserted   title.79  The proceeding applies to boundary line 
disputes and disputes relating to easements.80  The statutory scheme 
provides for appointment of a special master to determine who should 
receive notice and hear the title question.81  Upon receipt and acceptance of 
the   master’s   report,   title   is   noted   in   the   land   records   themselves   and   no  
separate certification issues.82 
Viewed in light of its history, the purpose of this enactment was to 
create a convenient, omnibus special proceeding for all instances in which 
the central dispute is with respect to title to land, with its own pleading 
requirements and specific set of remedies.83  However, the prior causes of 
action in ejectment and conventional quia timet were not repealed; indeed, 
the act expressly states that it is not intended as an exclusive remedy.84  
This  raises  the  question,  “why  not?”    One suspects that the real reason the 
legislature left the Georgia Code littered with increasingly overlapping 
remedies, where once there were distinct remedies for distinct purposes, 
was fear of unintended consequences that might deprive someone of a 
remedy.85  This is the old view of the law as an organic thing, each part 
 
 77 PINDAR, supra note 73, § 25-10. 
 78  Currently codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-60 to -73 (1991).  PINDAR, supra note 73, § 25-
11. 
 79 GA. CODE ANN. § 23-3-61 (1982). 
 80 See Middleton v. Robinson, 244 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. 1978) (boundary lines); Wiggins v. S. Bell Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 266 S.E. 2d 148 (Ga. 1980) (easements). 
 81 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-63 to -66 (1982). 
 82 Id. § 23-3-67 (1982). 
 83 See id. § 23-3-60: 
The purpose of this part is to create a procedure for removing any cloud upon the title to 
land, including the equity of redemption by owners of land sold at tax sales, and for readily 
and conclusively establishing that certain named persons are the owners of all the interests 
in land defined by a decree entered in such proceeding, so that there shall be no occasion 
for land in this state to be unmarketable because of any uncertainty as to the owner of every 
interest therein. 
 84 Id. § 23-3-72 (1982). 
 85 See Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 418–20 
(2004) (discussing fear of unintended consequences as a rationale  for  what  the  author  calls  “historical  
justification”  of  legal  doctrine). 
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linked to the other in ways that are so complex that coherent, constructive 
reform is difficult if not entirely impossible.86 
An example of why this attitude persists can be found in the case of 
MVP Investment Co. v. North Fulton Express Oil.87  In MVP, the plaintiff, a 
land developer, alleged that an adjoining landowner had built an earth slope 
on   the   plaintiff’s   property   in   order   to   provide   lateral   support   to   the  
defendant’s  property.88  The plaintiff brought the action in plain trespass, 
seeking damages, and the defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that 
the four-year statute of limitations for actions to recover for trespass to 
realty had passed.89  The plaintiff, apparently in response to the appearance 
of this defect in its case and not from any newfound interest in clarifying its 
title   to   the   land,   took   advantage   of  Georgia’s   liberal   amendment   rules   to  
amend its complaint to add a claim for ejectment, in essence recasting the 
claim as a title claim for which the period of limitation would derive from 
the adverse possession statute and not the statute respecting trespass to 
realty.90  The Georgia court of appeals allowed this, holding that the 
plaintiff had a legitimate claim for ejectment.91 
This was undoubtedly the correct decision in the narrow sense that the 
court correctly applied the cited precedents to the facts before it.92  
Conceptually, it is probably the correct outcome because, as the court 
argues, the dirt slope is certainly analogous to a structure erected by 
someone else and occupying the land, which would very clearly raise a title 
issue.93  As soon as the court accepted the framing of the issue as being 
whether the dirt slope constituted a continuing occupation of the property 
authorizing ejectment, the court appears to have had no choice but to 
decide as it did. 
On another level, however, the case is a bit troubling.  At first blush, 
this case appears to support an argument for trans-substantivity and against 
 
 86 See David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (1991) (describing 
suspicion  of  “rationalism”  and  “modernism”  as  “law’s  aboriginal  grand  tradition”). 
 87 639 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
 88 Id. at 534. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 535. 
 92 See id. at 534–35 (citing Wachstein v. Christopher, 57 S.E. 511, 512–13 (Ga. 1907) (holding 
foundation occupying  plaintiff’s  property  subject  to  removal);;  Navajo  Constr.  v.  Bringham,  608  S.E.2d  
732,  734  (Ga.  Ct.  App.  2004)  (holding  a  portion  of  a  neighbor’s  house  occupying  plaintiff’s  property  
subject to removal); Dep’t  of  Transp.  v.  Arnold,  530  S.E.2d  767,  771–72 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding 
that  government’s  “slope  easement”  constituted a taking). 
 93 See MVP, 639 S.E.2d at 534: 
Georgia law allows an owner of real property to bring an ejectment action to remove an 
adjoining property owner who, either by inadvertence or with predatory intent, encroaches 
upon the property of his neighbor.  The purpose of the action is to eject the defendant from 
possession of the disputed land.  A land  owner’s  entitlement  to  an  action  in  ejectment  stems  
from our deep-rooted belief that the owner of real property has the right to possess, use, 
enjoy, and dispose of it, and the corresponding right to exclude others from the use. 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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substance-specific procedure in that the plaintiff is protected by liberal 
modern pleading and amendment rules from any negative consequences 
arising from the fact that it chose initially to cast its complaint as an action 
for trespass, thus avoiding the alleged evil of punishing litigants for 
technical pleading defects.94  On the other hand, it is difficult not to see the 
attempt to reconfigure this case as an ejectment action as something of a 
pretext, given that the plaintiff really wanted monetary damages for the 
reduction in value of their property and not a writ of possession and award 
of mesne profits (the remedy in an ejectment action).95  Turning the case 
into a title action was clever lawyering, and no doubt a serious incentive to 
settlement by the defendant, but it is difficult to see this as being much 
different from the legal fictions of the writ-pleading era.96 
For present purposes, however, it is enough to note that the existence 
of special, substance-specific statutory proceedings respecting title to land 
did nothing to prevent the plaintiff in MVP from saving its case by 
recasting it as a title action.  Moreover, this would likely have still been the 
case even if the Georgia legislature had enacted the omnibus remedy to 
quiet title as the exclusive form of proceeding in title cases.  Imagine that 
the  Georgia  General  Assembly  had  established   the  “quia   timet  against  all  
the  world”  remedy  as  the  sole  and  exclusive  means  of  trying  title  issues  in  
Georgia.  The critics of substance-specific reform argue or imply that 
substance-specific procedure will have the same perceived fundamental 
problems as existed under code pleading—endless arguments regarding the 
nature of the claim and dismissal of cases for pleading errors.97  In this 
instance, however, there is no reason to assume that resort to an exclusive 
substance-specific procedural mechanism would necessarily have been 
unavailable  by  amendment  under  Georgia’s  liberal  version  of  Rule  15,  with  
relation back to preserve the claim against the statute of limitations.98  The 
infamous arguments over technicalities in code pleading were more a 
product of demurrer practice than of substance specificity in the abstract.99  
 
 94 See John S. Beckerman, Confronting  Civil  Discovery’s  Fatal  Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 
513–15  (2000)  (identifying  the  avoidance  of  “dispositions  on  the  basis  of  technicalities  of  pleading”  as  
a principal benefit of contemporary procedure). 
 95 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-11-7 (mesne profits), -14 (writ of possession) (2002). 
 96 Notoriously and ironically associated with the action in ejectment.  See supra note 58 and 
accompanying text. 
 97 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 98 See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-15 (2006); see also id. § 9-11-81: 
[The Georgia Civil Practice Act] shall apply to all special statutory proceedings except to 
the extent that specific rules of practice and procedure in conflict herewith are expressly  
prescribed by the law; but, in any event, the provisions of [the Georgia Civil Practice Act] 
governing the sufficiency of pleadings, defenses, amendments, counterclaims, cross-claims, 
third-party practice, joinder of parties and causes, making parties, discovery and 
depositions, interpleader, intervention, evidence, motions, summary judgment, relief from 
judgments, and the effect of judgments shall apply to all such proceedings. 
 99 See Hill v. Lariscy, 165 S.E.2d 315, 316–17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) (explaining the difference 
between the demurrer and the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Martin v. Approved 
Bancredit Corp., 163 S.E.2d 885, 886 (Ga. 1968) (same); see also Burbank, supra note  10,  at  1940  (“No  
one I know is suggesting a return to the forms of action or a wholesale rejection of trans-substantive 
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Moreover, if anything is clear from MVP, it is that boundary disputes 
among conceptual categories of cases persist, despite trans-substantive 
procedures, due to the persistence of category distinctions in the 
substantive law.100 
In  any  event,  the  “quia  timet  against  all  the  world”  remedy,  enacted  in  
the form of a non-exclusive proceeding, shows that substance-specific 
reform need not be in the form of exclusive categories of proceeding, but 
can instead appear in the form of procedural alternatives.  In sum, a broad 
range of substance-specific procedural mechanisms exist at the state level 
in the form of remedy-specific special statutory proceedings, and this 
reality does not necessarily lead to trial by technicality. 
III.  ACCOUNTING AND THE HISTORY OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 
Let us turn now to a proposal for a more innovative procedural reform 
premised on the accounting remedy scenario discussed in the introduction.  
The equitable accounting remedy needs to be understood in terms of its 
historical origins as a remedy with a procedural focus—a mechanism for 
providing a specific form of discovery to litigants able to avail themselves 
of equity, discovery that was not available in the ordinary course of civil 
practice at the time.101  A return to the remedial understanding of discovery 
on which this form of proceeding was premised provides the basis for a 
useful procedural alternative in fiduciary cases.  As discussed in the next 
section, it even suggests a way around the fraught political and ideological 
difficulties at the heart of the current debate regarding discovery reform. 
There was a procedure for accounting at law in common law pleading 
practice, which developed in response to the problem of assessing 
unliquidated damages against manorial bailiffs, for example, who collected 
rents and managed property on behalf of a landlord.102  Over time, 
however, equity courts proved to be a more flexible and efficient venue for 
accounting actions, in part because of the availability of more effective 
enforcement mechanisms.103  This remedy in equity was initially limited to 
cases involving  the  “special  grounds  of  equity”  such  as  accident,  mistake or 
fraud.104  But it quickly expanded to include other cases because it fulfilled 
a legitimate and substantial need for this type of discovery in aid of 
restitution in cases of unjust enrichment by fiduciaries.105 
 
procedure.”). 
 100 These distinctions not only persist but have continued to evolve.  See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, 
Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225 (2001) (discussing category distinctions in general and 
describing  the  evolution  of  Justice  Holmes’  understanding  of  torts  as  a  category  organized  around  the  
negligence principle). 
 101 See STORY, supra note 9, at §§ 436–45; see also Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 463–67 
(discussing the history of the accounting remedy). 
 102 Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 464.   
 103 Id. at 466.  
 104 STORY, supra note 9, §§ 437–40. 
 105 Id. 
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Accounting remained part of the more or less unique province of 
equity   until   1848,  when  New  York   adopted  David  Dudley  Field’s   “Field  
Code”   and   began   the   still   unfinished   process   of   banishing   the   distinction  
between law and equity.106  “Code  practice”  was   adopted   in  a  number  of  
other jurisdictions and was an inspiration for the adoption of the merger of 
law and equity in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.107  This in turn 
inspired its universal adoption at the state level and, along with it, liberal, 
trans-substantive discovery rules.108  With minor variations from one 
jurisdiction to the next, every American jurisdiction now allows extremely 
liberal discovery in civil practice without regard to whether the case is one 
that traditionally would have been brought in law or equity.109  And, with a 
few peculiar exceptions of little or no real consequence, the states purport 
to have abolished entirely the concept of exclusive jurisdiction over equity 
cases in special courts of equity.110 
The truth about the merger of law and equity from the standpoint of 
practitioners  “on  the  ground,”  however,   is  a  good  deal  more  complicated.    
To   begin   with,   “equitable   remedies   and   defenses”   persist   as   distinct  
creatures with distinct rules, both substantive and procedural.111  Moreover, 
equity continues to have an impact on jurisdiction, despite the creation of 
courts  of  “general”  jurisdiction.112 
 
 106 See Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 12, at 931–40 (discussing the merger of law 
and equity in the Field Code). 
 107 Id. at 943–82. 
 108 Id.  Note, however,  that  Subrin  is  very  critical  of  the  view  that  the  Field  Code  was  “a  parent  of”  
the Federal Rules, because he wants to emphasize the ways in which the Code continued common law 
pleading.  See id. at 931–40. 
 109 See 4 STATE OF NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947, COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY 611   (Comm.   Record   1947)   (“In   final   result,   New   Jersey,   Arkansas,   Mississippi   and  
Delaware remained the only states which still have an independent Court of Chancery with a separate 
body of judges administering equity   exclusively.”).      Of   these   four   states,   Arkansas   eliminated   its  
Chancery courts in 2001.  See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 
WASH. L. REV. 429, 496 n.409 (2003). 
 110 New Jersey still has a Chancery division of its superior court, which serves a purpose similar to 
the Delaware Court of Chancery in providing judges with special expertise in business matters.  Main, 
supra note 109, at 496 n.409.  The other states that have retained the nomenclature of distinct courts, 
such as Mississippi and Tennessee, have so far departed from the original distinction between law 
courts  and  equity  courts  that  the  use  of  the  word  “Chancery”  to  describe  these  courts  is  an  anachronism  
with little if any contemporary meaning.  Id. 
 111 See DOBBS, supra note 1, §§ 2.1–2.6. 
 112 In   Georgia,   for   example,   the   constitution   of   the   state   provides   for   direct   appeal   of   “equity  
cases”  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia.    See GA. CONST. art.  VI  §  6,  ¶  III  (“Unless  otherwise  provided 
by law, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction of . . .  [a]ll  equity  cases.”).    That  court  has  
responded to the resulting burden by narrowing its understanding  of  “equity  cases”  to  such  an  extent  as  
to essentially eliminate its jurisdiction over cases involving equitable remedies and defenses, taking the 
transparently self-serving position that the cases that come before them involving injunctions and so 
forth are really determined by legal issues and the role of equity is secondary.  See Redfearn v. 
Huntcliff   Homes   Ass’n,   524 S.E.2d 464, 465–67 (Ga. 1999).  However, the distinction remains, 
haunting sleep and sowing confusion.  See, e.g.,  Viola  E.  Buford  Family  Ltd.  P’ship  v.  Britt,  642  S.E.2d  
383,  384  n.1  (Ga.  Ct.  App.  2007)  (“We  note  that  the  Supreme  Court  has  determined  that this equity case 
does  not  fall  within  its  jurisdiction.”).    Similarly,  distinctions between law and equity continue to limit 
the jurisdiction of probate courts and other special statutory courts in Georgia, leading to the strange 
result that it is now possible  to  obtain  an  order  in  probate  court  directing  the  fiduciary  of  a  decedent’s  
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One example of the confusion arising from the persistence of equity in 
both substance and procedure is the remedy of equitable accounting.  As 
traditionally understood, this remedy has been difficult to reconcile with 
contemporary discovery rules that allow a party to obtain any financial 
information from a fiduciary without making a showing of entitlement 
other than the allegations in the good faith pleading.113  In response to this 
confusion,  Professor  Joel  Eichengrun  proposed  “remedying  the  remedy.”114  
Witnessing  the  accounting  remedy’s  loss  of  most  of  its  utility  and  meaning  
under contemporary procedure rules, Professor Eichengrun called for the 
remedy to be re-conceived around what he viewed as its sole remaining 
core of utility—the fact that it provides for an award of profits where a 
party has unjustly benefited from the use of a trust fund.115  Indeed, 
Professor Eichengrun called for opening this narrower remedy up to 
litigants outside of the fiduciary realm.116 
There are, however, problems with this approach.  To begin with, the 
core of the accounting remedy as reconceived by Professor Eichengrun—
the fact that it provides an avenue for obtaining an award of profits—is 
neither unique nor sufficiently free-standing to justify retaining the concept 
of accounting as an independent remedy.  The remedial benefits of 
“accounting   for   profits”   identified   by   Professor   Eichengrun   should   be  
available to a litigant through the ordinary avenues of the law of restitution 
and unjust enrichment.117  Moreover, in light of the availability of 
 
estate  to  act  in  a  certain  way  if,  and  only  if,  you  promise  not  to  call  it  an  “injunction.”    See Patterson v. 
Ellerbee, 603 S.E.2d 308, 311 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (Barnes, J., dissenting)   (recognizing   Georgia’s  
constitutional grant of exclusive equity jurisdiction to the superior courts); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-9-127 
(2005)   (“Probate   courts . . . shall have concurrent jurisdiction with superior courts with regard to the 
proceedings for . . . [d]eclaratory judgments involving fiduciaries.”);;   id. § 15-9-120 (limiting 
applicability of the article to counties with population in excess of 96,000); id. § 9-4-4 (defining the 
scope  of  the  declaratory  judgment  as  including  orders  “direct[ing] the executor, administrator, or trustee 
to do or abstain from doing any particular  act  in  his  fiduciary  capacity”). 
 113 See, e.g.,  Thompson  v.  Coughlin,  997  P.2d  191,  196  (Or.  2000)  (finding  that  plaintiff’s  access  
to discovery obviated the need for an accounting and that the parties were, accordingly, entitled to a 
jury trial). 
 114 See Eichengrun, supra note 2. 
 115 See id. at 485: 
The  true  accounting  yields  a  restitutionary  award  of  a  defendant’s  profits;;  the  “accounting”  
to settle complex or mutual accounts functionally grants a non-jury trial; and a now 
obsolete   remedy   also   called   an   “accounting”   compelled   discovery   in   cases   of   disputed  
accounts. . . . Finally, a theoretical consideration of the accounting suggests that the remedy 
be expanded to include the situation where a non-fiduciary has profited from the wrongful 
use  of  another’s  property. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 (Tentative Draft 
No. 4, 2005) (awarding restitution in cases of breach of fiduciary duty); James Steven Rogers, 
Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 
42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55 (2007) (describing much of the terminology associated with restitutionary 
remedies   as   “gibberish”   arising   from   the   traditional   conception   of   restitution   as   “parasitic”   on   other  
substantive  law  and  asserting  as  the  core  remedial  premise  of  the  law  of  restitution  the  principle  that  “a  
party who unjustifiably enriches himself at the expense of another owes a duty to pay a sum of money 
that will disgorge the enrichment”).     But see DOBBS, supra note 1, § 4.3(5) (following Eichengrun in 
identifying accounting for profits as a conceptually distinct restitutionary remedy). 
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discovery and, in complex cases, auditors, the procedurally distinct aspects 
of the accounting remedy—for example, the shifting of the burden of proof 
to the defendant with respect to set-offs and the availability of non-jury 
trials—seem less than compelling as reasons to retain the remedy as a 
distinct conceptual entity.118  Furthermore, the burden-shifting advanced by 
Professor Eichengrun as a primary advantage of the accounting remedy is 
not necessarily limited to accounting cases.119 
Another   reason  Professor  Eichengrun’s  proposal   has   failed   to   attract  
adherents may be that lawyers, by training, fear semantic confusion much 
less than they fear the possibility of rights being left without a remedy.  
Accordingly, there may be a tendency to allow remedies to linger past their 
“sell  by”  date.120  Still, the continuing existence of accounting as a separate 
statutory remedy may generate confusion among lawyers who are not legal 
historians.  Confusion costs clients money. 
It could be, however, that some of this confusion derives from the fact 
that,  from  the  practitioner’s  standpoint,  an  accounting  may  be  all   that  one  
wants, at least initially.  Imagine an attorney with a trust client who came 
into  her  office  concerned  about  a   trustee’s  refusal   to  provide   information,  
but  with  no  clear   evidence  of   foul  play.      In   the   author’s  own  experience,  
private fiduciaries often withhold information, not necessarily because they 
have committed some offense, but because they either do not like to be 
second-guessed by their beneficiary, they do not like to admit that their 
accounts are not neatly in order, or they simply do not want to go to the 
trouble of complying with a request for information about the trust.  
Nevertheless, if a fiduciary refuses to surrender documents, the lawyer 
ultimately is forced to bring a breach of duty claim in order to get 
discovery.121 
Of course, it is possible in a fiduciary case simply to bring a suit for 
accounting.  But this makes little sense, both because the remedy as 
traditionally conceived has been more or less emptied of meaning by 
contemporary discovery rules,122 and also because the rules as currently 
 
 118 For a discussion of these procedural aspects, see Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 477–81. 
 119 See, e.g., Cochran v. Ogletree, 536 S.E.2d 194, 196–97 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding burden of 
proof placed on defendant to establish set-off   in   case   of   unjust   enrichment   for   “money   had   and  
received”). 
 120 See Schwab   v.   Philip  Morris   USA,   449   F.   Supp.   2d   992,   1020   (E.D.N.Y.   2006)   (“[I]t   is   a  
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or 
action  at  law,  whenever  that  right  is  invaded.”)  (quoting  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
163 (1803)); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 123–24 (1982) 
(describing and justifying the inherent conservatism  of  attorneys  as  a  “retentionist  bias”). 
 121 Some states have experimented with allowing pre-litigation discovery.  See, e.g., OHIO R. CIV. 
P. 34(D).  However, pre-litigation discovery is allowable under the Federal Rules only in the form of a 
deposition, and only where the court finds that a pre-litigation deposition is necessary to   “prevent   a  
failure  or   delay  of   justice.”     FED. R. CIV. P. 27.  Moreover, even those states allowing pre-litigation 
discovery of documents require a finding of necessity and do not sanction pre-litigation discovery as a 
mechanism for ascertaining whether a claim exists.  See OHIO R. CIV. P. 34(D)(3)(b) (West Supp. 2007) 
(requiring a finding  that  the  plaintiff  is  “otherwise  unable  to  bring  the  contemplated  action”). 
 122 For an example of the practical consequences of discovery stripping equitable accounting of its 
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designed favor bringing claims together and may punish people for failing 
to bring related claims.123  So, the default option becomes a suit for breach 
of trust and an accounting. 
The  plaintiff’s  attorney  can  console  herself  with  the  fact  that  failure  to  
account to a beneficiary is itself a breach of fiduciary duty and may also be 
sufficient to support a good-faith claim of breach of fiduciary duty by 
mismanagement of funds or under some other theory.124  However, there 
are two problems with this approach on the practical (as opposed to the 
conceptual) level.  First, any efficiency which may derive from requiring 
litigants to bring all of their claims together may be lost when it results in 
bringing the entire mechanism of a civil action to bear on disputes that may 
only be a simple failure of communication.  Second, the claim that a 
fiduciary’s  failure  to  comply  with  pre-litigation demands for documents is 
itself a basis for a damages claim of breach of fiduciary duty, however 
conceptually neat it may appear on the surface, is something of a legal 
fiction with a real cost in terms of public perceptions of the litigation 
process as plaintiffs are forced to bring a hypothetical claim in order to find 
out whether they have a stronger one. 
Accordingly, although the accounting remedy as viewed through the 
lens of substantive reform is a relic that could be simply done away with, 
its persistence suggests the possibility of procedural reform such as an 
alternative discovery process conceived in remedial terms.  Imagine a 
special statutory proceeding for accounting in which certain plaintiffs with 
a basis for entitlement to an accounting could come forth in a separate 
action and demand a formal, judicially managed accounting of the fund.  
The defendant would either dispute the entitlement or produce an 
accounting, with the assistance of a neutral, court-appointed auditor where 
appropriate.  Upon acceptance of the accounting by the court as sufficient 
and complete, the parties would then have an opportunity to request 
additional discovery and exchange a demand for relief and response.  Such 
demand  could  be  premised  on  any  available  legal  theory  and  “tried”  in  an  
evidentiary hearing before the court, sitting without a jury.  Or the plaintiff 
could file a new civil action in common form without fear of res judicata 
except as to the issues actually decided in the accounting case. 
 
original purpose, see Thompson v. Coughlin, 997 P.2d 191, 196 (Or. 2000) (finding that discovery had 
allowed the plaintiff to establish an amount certain for damages, thus obviating the need for an 
accounting in equity, with the consequence that the case could proceed at law subject to a jury trial 
demand). 
 123 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982): 
When   a   valid   and   final   judgment   rendered   in   an   action   extinguishes   the   plaintiff’s  
claim . . . , the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the 
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected 
transactions, out of which the action arose. 
 124 GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 141 (6th ed.   1987)   (“Duty   to   Furnish   Information   to the 
Beneficiary”).    This  duty,  though  broad,  is  subject  to  a  reasonableness  limitation.    Id. 
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The benefit of this procedure is that it would allow the plaintiff to 
come forward and demand what she actually wants—access to the books to 
determine whether she has a claim—without having to premise this access 
on vague and poorly substantiated claims.  Moreover, it would tailor 
discovery to the circumstances by focusing the initial stage of discovery on 
obtaining an audit of the funds in question, or the equivalent.  Once that is 
established, the parties could pursue any trial preparation discovery that 
they needed, such as the deposition of experts, with a court-approved audit 
in hand.  From   a   defendant’s   point   of   view,   it would allow litigants to 
engage in a fishing expedition only after an initial showing of entitlement, 
such as an affidavit establishing a right to the accounting. 
This procedure could be limited to the cases in which an equitable 
accounting has traditionally been available: trust cases, partnership 
disputes, financial litigation involving complex, mutual accounts, et cetera.  
Indeed, given the continuing availability of ordinary discovery to litigants 
willing and able to state a good faith claim of breach of fiduciary duty, this 
procedure may seldom be used.  On the other hand, the remedial 
understanding of discovery on which this proposal is premised might turn 
out to have a wider application.  The next part takes a broader look at 
discovery and its origins in equity procedure. 
IV.  REVIVING THE BILL OF DISCOVERY 
The debate regarding substance-specific reform of civil procedure 
began with a general discussion about the pitfalls of trans-substantive 
procedure’s   attempt   to   capture   all   of   the   nuances   of   civil   practice   in   one  
conception of the civil action.125  However, the discussion quickly evolved 
into a more nuanced argument regarding the influence of equity procedure 
on rules reform, focusing on modern discovery practice.126  At least one 
commentator,   Stephen   Subrin,   identified   this   “conquest”   of   equity   over  
common law procedure as the source of pretty much everything that is 
wrong with contemporary civil litigation, from delay of outcomes to the 
death of the trial, with the primary evil being liberal discovery rules.127  As 
an alternative,   Subrin   called   for   “selective   substance-specific   procedure”  
reform through the establishment of default discovery limits specific to 
broad substantive categories of lawsuits,128 such as products liability or 
professional negligence. 
 
 125 See Cover, supra note 10, at 732–33: 
It is by no means intuitively apparent that the procedural needs of a complex antitrust 
action, a simple automobile negligence case, a hard-fought school integration suit, and an 
environmental class action to restrain the building of a pipeline are sufficiently identical to 
be usefully encompassed in a single set of rules which makes virtually no distinctions 
among such cases in terms of available process. 
 126 See Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 12, at 919, 1001. 
 127 Id. at 910–12, 983. 
 128 See Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 10, at 28. 
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In assessing this argument, we should begin by discussing what is 
meant  by  “equity  jurisprudence.”    The  classic  tale  of  the  origins  of  equity  
jurisprudence is that it arose to ameliorate injustices arising from too strict 
an application of common law rules, most notably procedural rules.  This is 
a conception  of  equity’s  origins  with   its   roots   in  Aristotle’s  discussion,   in  
Nichomacean Ethics,   of   “epieikeia”   as   a   force   moderating   the   strict  
demands   of   the   law,   “a   rectification   of   legal   justice.”129  As recounted 
recently by Thomas Main, the story goes something like this: 
The Chancellor unrolled a vast body  of  legal  principle  that  we  know  as  “equity”  
to offer relief in those cases where, because of the technicality of procedure, 
defective methods of proof, and other shortcomings in the common law, there 
was   no   “plain,   adequate   and   complete”   remedy   otherwise available. . . . 
Intervention was premised on the notion that justice incorporated the moral sense 
of the community, existing as a function not only   of   a   community’s   technical  
rules,  but  also  of  “magisterial  good  sense,  unhampered  by  rule.”130 
In this conception, flexibility and common sense are identified as the 
essential aspects of equity.  However, much of the history of equity 
jurisprudence as it was actually practiced has been identified as a fall from 
grace—an abandonment of these principles by judges facing temptation in 
the form of precedent and rule-making and finding themselves unable to 
resist.131 
It is interesting to note that earlier historians of equity jurisprudence 
were quite critical of this explanation, viewing it as an origins myth that 
tells us more about the ideological justifications for equity than it does 
about the actual circumstances of its origins.132  For example, Joseph Story 
essentially rejects the notion that equity arose as a general corrective action 
against the rigidity in the classical common law, arguing instead that equity 
arose from the need for specific, unprovided-for remedies: 
 
 129 5 ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS Ch. 10 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books 
further rev. ed. 2004) (1953). 
 130 Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 
441–42 (2003). 
 131 See, e.g., PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONST- 
ITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 11–18 (1990); see also Fiona R. Burns, The Court of Chancery in the 19th 
Century: A Paradox of Decline and Expansion, 21 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 198 (2001) (arguing against 
this view in part, noting that the nineteenth-century Court of Chancery in England was in some ways 
increasingly burdened by the transition from a discretionary to a precedential model of jurisprudence 
but nonetheless managed to create new substantive equitable doctrines such as breach of confidence and 
the equitable covenant). 
 132 See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *429–30 (2002): 
EQUITY  then,  in   it’s  [sic]   true  and  genuine  meaning,  is  the  [s]oul  and  [s]pirit  of  all   law:  
po[s]itive law is con[s]trued, and rational law is made, by it.  In this, equity is 
[s]ynonymous to ju[s]tice; in that, to the true [s]en[s]e and [s]ound interpretation of the 
rule.  But the very terms of a court of equity and a court of law, as contra[s]ted to each 
other, are apt to confound and mi[s]lead us: as if the one judged without equity, and the 
other was not bound by any law.  Whereas every definition or illu[s]tration to be met with, 
which now draws a line between the two juri[s]dictions, by [s]etting law and equity in 
oppo[s]ition to each other, will be found either totally erroneous, or erroneous to a certain 
degree. 
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Many persons, and especially foreigners, have often expressed surprise that 
distinct courts should in England and America be established for the 
administration of equity, instead of the whole administration of municipal justice 
being confided to one and the same class of courts without any discrimination 
between law and equity.  But this surprise is founded almost wholly upon an 
erroneous view of the nature of Equity Jurisprudence.  It arises from confounding 
the general sense of equity, which is equivalent to universal or natural justice, ex 
æquo et bono, with its technical sense, which is descriptive of the exercise of 
jurisdiction over peculiar rights and remedies.133 
In other words, taking his lead from Blackstone, Story argued for a 
view of equity jurisdiction as a simple function of certain remedies being 
allowed in one set of courts as distinct from others, due to circumstances 
unique to the Anglo-American history, and not as an attempt to embody 
abstract principles about the administration of justice.134 
It   is   impossible   to   read   Story’s   account  without   catching   a  whiff   of  
special pleading since he provides ample evidence, from sources both 
ancient and contemporary   to   him,   that   the   association   of   “equity”   in   the  
legal   sense  with   “equity”   in   the  philosophical   sense   is  more   than   just   the  
result of confusion among classically educated foreigners.135  Still, it is 
useful to understand that equity has sometimes been viewed as something 
best defined not in the abstract, but in a more particular sense as a 
collection of remedies.  For the present purpose, it is worth noting that this 
is how equity jurisprudence was defined by perhaps the most influential 
treatise author of the period when the merger of law and equity began in 
this country with the adoption of the Field Code.136 
In  Story’s  version  of   the  history  of  equity,   the  key   factor  behind   the  
origin and expansion of equity was not the availability of in personam 
 
 133 STORY, supra note 9, at 26–31 (internal citations omitted). 
 134 See id. at   20   (“Equity   Jurisprudence   may   therefore   properly   be   said   to   be   that   portion   of  
remedial justice which is exclusively administered  by  a  Court  of  Equity”);; see also id. at  11  (“‘It  is  said’  
[Blackstone]  remarks  ‘that  it  is  the  business  of  a  Court  of  Equity   in  England  to  abate   the  rigor  of   the  
common   law.      But   no   such   power   is   contended   for.”   (quoting   WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 
COMMENTARIES 430)).  Note that some commentators have been highly critical   of   Blackstone’s  
conception of equity.  See, e.g., 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 
54   (Spencer  W.  Symons  ed.,  5th  ed.  1941)   (“This   is  one  example  among  many  of  Blackstone’s  utter  
inability to comprehend the real spirit and workings of the English law.”);;   see also Sir W. S. 
Holdsworth, Blackstone’s  Treatment  of  Equity, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1929). 
 135 See STORY, supra note 9, at 1–22.    Story’s  special  pleading  here   is   in  defense  of  his  organic  
conception of the law as the product of a specific, complex history—a fundamentally conservative 
vision of the law that led him to be critical of the contemporary codification movement.  See GERALD T. 
DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 315–18 (2d prtg. 1970); JAMES 
MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL 
THOUGHT 89–98 (1971). 
 136 Main acknowledges this definition but ultimately rejects it as being, among other things, 
“circular.”     Thomas  O.  Main,  ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 345–46 (2005).  Main 
sees  a  bright  prospect  for  ADR  taking  on  what  he  conceives  to  be  equity’s  traditional  role  of  providing  
a flexible alternative to litigation.  See id. at 344–53 (discussing the history of equity and citing 
numerous nineteenth and early-twentieth century sources on the subject).  For a contrary view, see 
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from Equity Jurisprudence 
and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57 (2004). 
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relief in the form of the injunction to compel conduct outside of the 
litigation itself—the primary factor in many more contemporary accounts 
of  equity’s  history137—but the special power of the equity courts to compel 
discovery.138  “Indeed,”  he  argues,  “every bill in equity may be said to be in 
some sense a bill of discovery, since it asks for the personal oath of the 
defendant, to purge himself in regard to the transactions stated in the 
bill.”139  This liberal approach to discovery was the inspiration for the 
approach taken in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when they made 
their debut in 1938.140  It is also broadly understood that liberal discovery 
has always had a dark side, with critics of expanded discovery procedure 
identifying discovery, as opposed to increased formalism, as the source of 
the infamous delays and backlogged dockets associated with Chancery 
practice in nineteenth-century England.141  The fundamental problem is 
described in Dickens’  famous  description  of  Chancery  court,  which  makes  
reference to the evolution of formalism in the adoption of equity 
precedent—a common theme of contemporary critics142—but focuses 
primarily on delay and expense: 
On such an afternoon, some score of members of the High Court of Chancery bar 
ought to be—as here they are—mistily engaged in one of the ten thousand stages 
of an endless cause, tripping one another up on slippery precedents, groping 
knee-deep in technicalities, running their goat-hair and horse-hair warded heads 
against walls of words, and making a pretence of equity with serious faces, as 
players might.  On such an afternoon, the various solicitors in the cause, some 
two or three of whom have inherited it from their fathers, who made a fortune by 
it, ought to be—as are they not?—ranged in a line, in a long matted well (but you 
might  look  in  vain  for  Truth  at  the  bottom  of  it),  between  the  registrar’s  red  table  
and the silk gowns, with bills, cross-bills, answers, rejoinders, injunctions, 
affidavits,   issues,   references   to   masters,   masters’   reports,   mountains of costly 
nonsense, piled before them.143 
In a series of articles beginning in 1987, Professor Subrin elaborated 
on this dark side of equity procedure, finding the origin of contemporary 
procedure in equity to be the source of most, if not all, of the problems that 
contemporary critics perceive in the Federal Rules and its state 
counterparts—most notably, the delay and expense associated with 
unlimited, largely unsupervised discovery practice.144  As an alternative, 
Professor Subrin proposed a partial retreat from the trans-substantive 
 
 137 See, e.g., HOFFER, supra note 127, at 12–19 (identifying the origins of equity jurisprudence as 
arising from conflict surrounding the special authority of the Chancery courts to exercise the royal 
prerogative to compel attendance and enjoin conduct). 
 138 See STORY, supra note 9, at 22–23.  
 139 Id. 
 140 Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 12, at 943–75. 
 141 See id. at 977–84; see also id. at  1001  (“As  Dickens  and  others  had  known  for  centuries,  equity  
procedure is slow and cumbersome, and has a high potential for arbitrariness.”). 
 142 For a discussion of the role of precedent in the decline of Chancery practice, see Burns, supra 
note 127. 
 143 CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 2 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1853). 
 144 Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 10, at 29–37. 
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premise of the Federal Rules in the form of default, substance-specific 
discovery limits to be established by consensus among stakeholders in the 
various fields of litigation that are the “most   discovery-prone.”145  Most 
cases, he argued, have very little need for discovery, and practitioners 
would likely be willing to exchange most of their current discovery 
entitlement for fixed trial dates at the outset of litigation.146  Those cases 
that do require more extensive discovery should have it but would benefit 
from default rules limiting discovery to those documents and depositions 
identified by stakeholders as necessary to the specific type of case, with 
discovery outside of those limits available only with leave of court.147 
Subrin’s  conception  of  “substance”  differs  markedly  from  what  most  
people would anticipate because he is not really talking about substance in 
the  sense  of  specific  claims  or  causes  of  action,  but  in  the  sense  of  “types”  
of lawsuits, broadly conceived.148  However, many critics renounced this 
proposal as if it called for a return to the common law pleading practice, 
arguing that this approach would encourage boundary disputes regarding 
classification of cases and punish litigants for technical pleading errors.149  
Moreover, the call for stakeholder consensus has been identified by 
Subrin’s  critics as potentially more naive than the assumption of attorney 
cooperation in discovery on which the current rules are premised.150 
A different approach, which might be more palatable to some, would 
be to allow a partial return to the older understanding of managed 
discovery as a type of remedy—a substantive end rather than simply a 
procedural means to other ends—the attractions of which were explored in 
the previous part.  However, a remedy-focused reform of discovery might 
be significantly different, and in some ways actually more traditional, than 
the subject-matter specific discovery limits proposed by Subrin.  Instead, it 
would involve the creation of an alternative procedural creature modeled 
on the traditional bill of discovery. 
Creating an alternative managed discovery procedure premised on an 
understanding that managed discovery is something substantively different 
from ordinary discovery might avoid some of the criticisms leveled at 
 
 145 Id. at 47–49. 
 146 Id. at 45–48. 
 147 Id. at 47–49. 
 148 Id. at  48  (identifying  “categories  of  cases,  such  as,  products  liability,  antitrust,  securities fraud, 
section  1983,  employment  discrimination,  and  malpractice”  as  appropriate  targets  for  substance-specific 
procedural reform). 
 149 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 11; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-
Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2238–47 (1989); 
Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. 
REV. 761, 822–25 (1993). 
 150 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey 
of  Discovery  “Reform,” 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.  197,  237  (2001)  (“It  may  be  too  difficult  to  effect 
set rules in cases such as discrimination or product liability, where the affected parties fear the 
distributional consequences  of  presumptive  limits  on  or  entitlements  to  discovery.”).    For  a  discussion  
of the flaws in the assumptions underlying attorney cooperation in discovery, see John S. Beckerman, 
Confronting Civil Discovery’s  Fatal  Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 512–16 (2000). 
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Subrin’s  approach  to  substance as a process of identifying and attempting 
to   create   default   rules   for   various   “types”   of   litigation.      The   approach  
would be “substance-specific”   in   that   it   recognizes   some   forms   of  
procedure as more appropriate to some types of cases than others, without 
requiring rule-makers or judges to decide what those types are.  Instead, 
litigants would be encouraged to decide what they want.  The approach is 
also substance-specific in that it understands discovery management as 
something that litigants want as a substantive end in itself.  Approaching 
reform in this way might avoid, at least in part, the criticism that (a) 
substance-specific procedure creates fertile ground for boundary disputes; 
(b) it necessarily politicizes the reform process; and (c) it punishes litigants 
for simple pleading errors.  A flexible approach substituting the concept of 
remedial managed discovery might also encourage a movement away from 
current defense-oriented approaches to discovery reform, which create 
barriers  to  entry  and  penalties  for  perceived  “abuse.”151 
What would remedial discovery look like?  Again, remedial discovery 
would be managed discovery.  Unlike the ordinary discovery motion, 
which is essentially a plea for judicial intervention in a process intended to 
be conducted by the parties, remedial discovery would involve a petition 
for the appointment of a special master, not just to resolve specific 
disputes, but to take an active role in developing a discovery plan for the 
parties that is more than just a series of deadlines.  This would ensure that 
the case not only moves forward, but that it moves forward with 
appropriately tailored discovery. 
Of course, this is by no means the first call for management of 
discovery by special masters appointed to take the ever-increasing burden 
of case management.  What makes this proposal somewhat different is the 
recognition   of   the   “managed   case”   as   a   potentially   distinct   procedural  
entity with its own rules.  This may sound like a fantasy, given stretched 
judicial resources and the futility of so many efforts to increase judicial 
management of discovery.152  A number of things are worth noting, 
however.  For one thing, instead of attempting to increase case 
management in every case, litigants would be permitted to choose more 
intrusive and potentially limiting case management as an alternative 
manner of proceeding.  They would gain something that many practitioners 
want in exchange for giving up some control over the process.  This would 
be very different from simply referring all discovery disputes to a discovery 
master.  Instead, it could co-exist with the current system as an alternative 
for cases where one or more of the parties recognize a genuine need for 
 
 151 See Stempel, supra note 146; see also Beckerman, supra note 146, at 517–18 (identifying 
problems associated with the expectation of cooperative discovery within the context of our adversarial 
litigation culture).  But see Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 1884–92 (arguing that adversarial litigation 
systems have a special need for procedural equality). 
 152 See Stempel, supra note 146, at 241–45 (advocating for full-time discovery masters in the 
federal system but recognizing the forces that might limit their effectiveness). 
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case management.  Moreover, the parties need not have access to the 
special master of right.  The court could serve as gatekeeper, and would 
likely retain the power to sanction for genuine discovery abuse. 
This procedure might also co-exist with the thin discovery option 
proposed by Professor Subrin, where litigants agree to strict discovery 
limits in exchange for a fast track to trial.  This proposal recognizes the 
reality that sometimes what the parties want is their day in court, and they 
may be willing to give up their ordinary, broadly-defined discovery 
entitlement to get it.  Again, this is substance-specific procedure in the 
broad sense of giving the parties access to procedural alternatives that they 
think are better suited to their case, without requiring them to establish 
entitlement by showing that their case conforms to any particular theory of 
action, inspired by the recognition that discovery can be viewed as 
something that people do or do not want in its own right. 
The presence of these alternative approaches to discovery might lead 
to a transformation of ordinary motion practice respecting discovery by 
encouraging judges to view discovery motions less as a plea for case 
management and more as a motion for sanctions, which currently are 
seldom imposed in discovery disputes.  In other words, creating the 
possibility of discovery management by a special master would encourage, 
but not necessarily require, judges to reconceive their role in ordinary 
discovery motion practice, primarily policing against abusive practices 
rather than resolving disputes about whether discovery requests are 
appropriately tailored to the claims.  This approach would create 
alternatives without reconfiguring civil practice in its entirety.  Although 
some will object to limits on discovery, it is important to note that limits 
are already being imposed in the federal system and in forms that are much 
less benign than a discovery plan imposed by a special master.153 
CONCLUSION 
The existence of categories of litigation that are politically charged, 
with clearly defined classes of   litigants  standing   to  “win”  or  “lose”  in  the  
reform process, need not lead to the conclusion that any departure from the 
trans-substantive premise of the rules would inevitably lead to favoritism in 
the rule-making process.  If we look at substance-specific procedure reform 
outside  of  the  “political  cockpit,”  we  find  that  it  is  already  happening,  and  
is not necessarily frightening.  Instead of containerizing reform in 
politically contested categories, non-exclusive procedural alternatives 
modeled after the special statutory procedures that already exist in state law 
can provide a way to tailor procedure to the needs of litigants without the 
risks associated with wholesale substance-specific reform. 
 
 153 See Stempel, supra note 146 (discussing recent attempts to reform civil discovery to remedy 
perceived abuses). 
